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Constitutional rights leave a mark on almost every subject in the American
law school curriculum. The terse words of the U.S. Bill of Rights, interpreted
famously in a “field of pain and death,”1 matter greatly. They forbid, permit, or
require various state actions; even their silences are important. This is true, as
an early generation of constitutional scholarship pointed out, not only for the
“discrete and insular” minorities underserved by majoritarian processes, but for
the “diffuse and anonymous” minorities and majorities as well.2 It is still open
for debate as to whether constitutional rights should be handled more like
dentistry or politics;3 it is clear, nonetheless, that their expressive, educative,
polarizing, doctrinal, and material effects are well activated within American
constitutional culture. Even the pathways of constitutional backsliding divert
directly through constitutional rights, just as do the strategies of defense.4
But is this true of constitutional rights everywhere? In terms of textual
content, we know that the rest of the world’s constitutions seek to guarantee
much more than the venerable U.S. Bill of Rights. Constitutions over the past
two decades, in particular, have grown in length and promises.5 They tend to
protect the conventional civil and political rights of the U.S. Bill of Rights
but add such economic and social rights as rights to social security, education,
and health care; newer rights such as the rights to land, water, sanitation, and
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a clean and healthy environment, and even rights for animals and nature.6 As
demonstrated by a global field of study, these constitutions are also often easier
to amend and update, subject to a different method of judicial reasoning and
balancing, and interpreted by very differently designed constitutional or apex
courts.7 The pathways of constitutional backsliding—an almost worldwide
phenomenon that gathered speed during the past rocky decade8—do not leave
them untouched. How do these constitutional rights matter? And how can
we tell?
Enter Adam Chilton and Mila Versteeg’s new book, which deploys both
quantitative and qualitative comparative research in the search for empirical
answers. Chilton, a professor at the University of Chicago Law School, and
Versteeg, a professor at the University of Virginia School of Law, open their
examination with a deflationary view. Eschewing the conventional wisdom of
American constitutional culture, they instead choose to invoke the realist—
or radically relativist—foreign policy of Henry Kissinger. As secretary of
state in 1975, Kissinger famously replied to his Turkish counterpart, Melih
Esenbal, in relation to a proposal whose illegality had already been confirmed,
“‘[T]he illegal we do immediately, the unconstitutional takes a little longer.’
[laughter]”9. This perspective, suggest Chilton and Versteeg, may be a more
apt description of constitutional practice in a world of Russia’s Vladimir Putin,
Turkey’s Recep Erdoğan, or Hungary’s Viktor Orbán. Constitutional rights
matter, they suggest, but very little. Indeed, rights that they term "individual"
may not matter much at all. Rights they term "organizational" may matter
somewhat, in the face of concerted opposition, but only for a limited time.
I. Empirical Constitutional Studies
Both Chilton and Versteeg are astute empiricists in the field of comparative
constitutional law. In this work, they favor a mixed methods research approach
to examine how constitutional rights matter in constitutional systems outside
the United States. Their study involves statistical surveys from a coded database
of the world’s constitutions, which includes eight key rights: freedom of speech,
the prohibition of torture, freedom of movement, the right to education, the
right to health care, freedom of religion, the right to unionize, and the right to
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establish political parties.10 They select these rights and not others, as they note,
because of the presence of data on their realization.11 Alongside the coding of
capital-C constitutional text, they also conduct interviews with judges, religious
leaders, trade unionists and civil society representatives in Colombia, Myanmar,
Poland, Russia, and Tunisia. They therefore seek out “nominal” rather than
“functionalist” or “essentialist” constitutional rights, by which they mean they
count the rights that local participants consider to have risen to constitutional
status, rather than those that emphasize core constitutional functions or those
that are merely textually entrenched.12 With this data, Chilton and Versteeg
seek to answer causal questions of how constitutional rights outside the United
States make a difference.
Unsurprisingly, they find little evidence that textual protections of
constitutional rights, by themselves, provide for a firewall guarantee of
protection. This by now familiar conclusion has been reached in decades of
socio-legal scholarship in relation to rights of many hues (labor protections,
civil rights, education rights, health care rights, and/or international human
rights), usually by qualitative case study. Their approach draws partly on
law and society scholars like Stuart Scheingold (who mapped the “politics
of rights”)13 and comparativists like Charles Epp (who referred to the “social
support structure” needed for a “rights revolution”).14 Alongside these
domestic and comparative studies, Chilton and Versteeg also engage with
political scientists examining the effect of international human rights law
on the domestic law of different states. Beth Simmons, Oona Hathaway and
other political scientists have long dampened any enthusiasm for human
rights treaties, by offering somewhat similar observations15—i.e., that there is
nothing “self-enforcing” about rights, and that textual or legal guarantees are
only a sideshow on the journey of rights protection.
More notable is Chilton and Versteeg’s finding that some rights, once
constitutionalized, are harder to violate than others. The constitutional rights
that they code as freedom of religion, the right to unionize, and the right to
form political parties are systematically associated with an improvement along
the outcomes they measure; other constitutional rights, including the right to
10
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free speech, the prohibition on torture, the freedom of movement, the right to
education, and the right to health care are not. In their model, the former rights
are practiced by, or within, an organization, while the latter are individualized.
Thus, because religious groups, unions, and parties have a vested interest in
their protection, these organizational rights became "self-enforcing”16 across
different constitutional systems. Interestingly, the authors suggest that this
self-enforcement occurs even without the backstop of independent courts
or democratic regimes. This finding shifts both litigation and voting as the
primary mechanisms for constitutional rights protection. Sometimes this is
because the protection of these rights aligns with government interests; but
even when it does not, strong organizations succeed in lobbying against or
otherwise defending against rights violations that might limit their ability to
operate, giving rise to a “self-enforcing” feedback loop in support of the rights’
durability and staying power.17
The authors suggest that organizational rights, while harder to violate than
individual rights, are best viewed as “speedbumps” that can help slow down a
government that is actively attempting to repress rights but cannot necessarily
prevent such conduct over a longer period.18 Indeed, Chilton and Versteeg
suggest that the “speedbumps” metaphor is more accurate than the popular
image of American constitutional culture, that rights operate as “ropes” that
tie the government (Ulysses) from the call of acts of repression or shipwreck
(the sirens).19 The implication is that our constitutional theories are usefully
updated by comparative empirical study.
II. Disaggregating Constitutional Rights
The disaggregation of constitutional rights into differently situated interests,
of different political strength, is not new. Just as the distinction between insular
and diffuse rights-holders worked to frame the priorities of judicial review in
past U.S. constitutional commentary,20 so too have theorists of rights long
understood that the power valence of particular rights operates differently.
Indeed, liberal theorists have interrogated important conceptual questions
about the instrumental versus intrinsic importance of different rights.21
Rights of democratic participation, for example, have been theorized as both
intrinsically important for each individual and instrumentally “preservative
of all rights.”22 The right to education—or at the very least “some identifiable
16
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quantum”23 of it—has been described as an “empowerment” right, helping
those who are economically and socially marginalized to obtain the means to
participate in their communities and defend their rights.24 And equality rights
of women, introduced in conditions of religious, cultural, and social hostility,
have been described as “placeholder” rights in an inevitably slow and nonlinear process of change.25 These rights clearly do more than bind Ulysses to
the mast.
Chilton and Versteeg are, however, firmly focused on the instrumental
question, and only on the empirically testable dimension of that question. In
addition to guiding their choice of what constitutional rights to study, their
empirical focus and search for causes forces them to seek out only what is
measurable over a confined timeline (at most, over several decades, but in
some cases for no more than the five years after constitutional entrenchment).26
Nor do they entertain questions of how prominent rights “spill over” from one
arena of protection, such as how the protection of educational rights might
affect, say, democracy rights or health rights.27 This restriction is somewhat illmatched to the larger questions they seek to answer, as discussed below.
Instead, they design their study around two prominent theoretical
challenges of political agency: the coordination problem, which impedes
diverse or differently motivated citizens, and the collective action problem,
which discourages a rational individual from taking part in joint action.28 As
they note, dedicated organizations can help overcome these two problems,
and formal organizations with a membership base and ties of loyalty and
financial backing can do this best. In other words, some rights attract a
“natural organizational vehicle,” but others do not;29 it is these vehicles that
118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
23
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make these rights “self-enforcing.” This theory draws from, as Chilton and
Versteeg acknowledge, stability-focused studies of constitutional political
economy,30 where a constitution’s “self-enforcement” occurs when political
opponents gain more from cooperating within a constitutional order than
from attempting to derail it.
In identifying these vehicles, Chilton and Versteeg emphasize the corporate
dimension of particular “organizational” rights. This includes religious liberty
and the recognition of organized religion, and guarantees of the associational
rights of trade unions, registered political parties and their ability to
participate in electoral cycles.31 This corporatized status allows such collectives
to secure access to legal personality, register members, sue, make payments,
etc. As well as the ability to access corporate form, Chilton and Versteeg also
measure the organizations’ ability to protect certain “core activities,” such as
collective worship in the case of religious groups, and collective bargaining
or political activity in the case of unions and parties. These outcomes are
plotted statistically and also form the basis of their interviews and case studies.
These reveal important insights, particularly in explaining the strength of
constitutional religious freedom in recent decades. These findings, as well as
the authors’ conclusions about rights to health care and education, and about
organizational as opposed to associational rights, are discussed below.
A. Religious Freedom
The disaggregation of religion from other rights provides an instructive
insight about the past two decades of global constitutionalism. For Chilton
and Versteeg, religious freedom rights are best measured as rights to religious
liberty. While those practicing minority (and even majority) religions would
surely point to the separation of church and state and the protections against
religious discrimination as core to religious freedom, Chilton and Versteeg’s
thinner version of religious rights opens up an interesting tracing exercise. In
1946, freedom of religion was included in eighty percent of the constitutions
then in force; by 2016 this number had risen to ninety-five percent,32 which
includes the right’s individual and organizational character.33 (The related
right not to be discriminated against based on religious beliefs, and the
30

Sonia Mittal & Barry R. Weingast, Self-Enforcing Constitutions: With an Application to Democratic
Stability in America’s First Century, 29 J. L., Econ, & Org. 278 (2013); see also Daryl F. Levinson,
Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 657 (2011);
Sujit Choudhry, Resisting Democratic Backsliding: An essay on Weimar, self-enforcing constitutions, and the
Frankfurt School, 7 Glob. Constitutionalism 54 (2018).
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Laycock, The Campaign Against Religious Liberty, in The Rise of Corporate Religious Liberty
231 (Micah Schwartzman et al., eds, 2016)).
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guaranteed separation of church and state, are not nearly as prominent.34)
Chilton and Versteeg demonstrate that an organization protected by religious
freedom works more effectively than individuals can, when governments
move to limit the right. This is partly due to the organization’s relative control
over limitations arguments: Governments often act within doctrinal
requirements that require them to justify any limitations of rights, and the
“ambiguities [in defense of rights] are more easy to exploit for individual over
organizational rights.”35
The right to religion thus tilts toward features that are protective of religious
organizations. The strength of the religious organization(s) is itself bolstered
through the ties of loyalty created, the social, moral, psychological, and
identity-based benefits conferred, and the mobilizational effects of physical
church spaces, practices of worship, and charismatic leaders.36 Chilton and
Versteeg’s brief case study involves not the United States (which might be
highly instructive for their thesis),37 but Russia, and the long opposition by the
Russian Orthodox Church to proposed laws restrictive of religious freedom.
This clearly majority religious organization helped to delay the suspension of
religious liberty under Russian President Vladimir Putin for a time, but it did
not ultimately prevent the 2016 Yarovaya’s Law, which is highly restrictive of
religious organizations in general but is particularly restrictive of minority and
“foreign” religions (as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and Church of Scientology
went on to experience in Russian courts).
This case study, which launches the book’s opening chapter, supports their
arguments that both organizational rights are more resilient to government
limitation than individual rights, and that this strength can hold out for only so
long. Thus, this apparently unfavorable story about the effectiveness of rights
(long term) takes on a different cast when compared with “individual” rights in
Russia, which were far more rapidly eroded. The Russian Orthodox Church
was able to protect religious liberty and defend its constitutional rights for far
longer than the Russian media were able to do with the constitutional right to
free speech. The latter right was far more quickly co-opted by a government
intent on control, because, according to Versteeg and Chilton, of a lack of
organizational defense (the media being bought by government).38
34
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The book’s highlighting of the organizational strength that helps to ‘selfenforce’ religious liberty will be of interest to legal scholars who observe the
lopsided dimensions of certain rights conflicts (LGBTQ rights and women’s
sexual and reproductive health rights and protections against domestic
violence being immediate and very relevant cases in point, although, as
noted, these rights are not included in their constitutional rights survey39).
That said, the study does somewhat flatten the treatment of majority religious
organizations (as opposed to minority religious organizations) within different
constitutional systems, and overlooks the peculiar and very direct effect that
religion can have on the enjoyment of other constitutional rights.40
B. Rights to Education and Health Care
While this treatment of the organizational dimension of religious liberty is
instructive, particularly as compared with the effectiveness of the rights they
code as "individual"—including the right to speech, the prohibition of torture
and the freedom of movement—the insights that come from the authors’
treatment of rights to education and health care are more limited. Under
Chilton and Versteeg’s model, these rights are also coded as "individual,” as
they provide individual benefits to claimants. They concede that such rights
operate narrowly or regressively when operationalized as individual rather
than collective guarantees, but they claim that this is a better description,
given that schools and hospitals (their only canvassed possibilities) present
little evidence as adequate organizational defenders,41 and that individual
successes are implemented more easily than joint or collective claims. To
answer the question of the empirical effect of these rights, they choose to
include changes to social spending within the five years before and after
the rights’ constitutional entrenchment.42 With this measure, they find little
to establish a causal link between constitutionalization and social spending
increases. They ultimately conclude that such rights are likely not to matter,
thus confirming their thesis that “individual rights” are constitutively distinct
from “organizational rights.”
Two literatures are critical to understand the limitations of this insight.
The first is a copious and recent comparative constitutional literature. As
Chilton and Versteeg themselves note, numerous empirical studies have
39
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all other constitutional rights), but also the existence of crossovers between religion and the
very domains under Chilton and Versteeg’s study, such in the formation of political opinion,
the social service sector, and the field of education).
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sought to measure the impact of economic and social rights across different
constitutional systems. Much of this scholarship focuses on success stories
and the qualifications that must accompany measures of success—in Brazil,
Colombia, India, Indonesia, South Africa, and the American states.43 Apart
from their case study of Colombia’s litigation around the constitutional right
to health care, which they concede complicates their finding that rights do not
matter, they do not wrangle with these studies’ implications that organizations
and social movements may spring from the presence of constitutional rights
and may be galvanized or mobilized by them.44 They are disappointed by the
right to health care in Colombia, given the slow and nonlinear successes that
were wrought from judicial activism and social mobilization (taking a period
of at least seven years),45 but this unevenness is unsurprising in light of these
omitted studies. In part this is because Chilton and Versteeg are unwilling to
let courts cloud too much of their findings—and clearly, there is only a handful
of unusually “activist” courts in the Global South46—yet a more committed
consideration of these findings would be helpful; not least because their
disaggregation of particular rights would add interesting dimensions to that
literature.47
The second literature includes the lines drawn between welfare state studies
and human rights measurement. For the former, it is salutary to note that the
first generation of comparativists in welfare state studies also assumed that
levels of social spending could adequately reflect a state’s commitment to
economic and social rights. As seminal studies like Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s
showed, these studies were misleading48: Expenditures were epiphenomenal in
the rich countries he assessed. All spending does not count equally; moreover,
high spending can be a function of high unemployment, while low spending
on some programs can signify a more serious commitment to full employment.
Even in developing countries, where marginal returns to spending tend to be
43

Many empirical studies are cited, id. at 170–71, including Courting Social Justice: Judicial
Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights in the Developing World (Varun Gauri
& Daniel M. Brinks eds., 2008) and Social Rights Judgments and the Politics of
Compliance: Making It Stick (Malcolm Langford et al. eds., 2017).
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higher, other policy measures, addressed to governance or inflation, can at
times achieve similar results, and the quality of governance (including control
of corruption) strongly influences any positive effects.49 These warnings were
internalized in the design of human rights measures, which combine different
indicators to capture economic and social rights fulfillment, such as outcomes
like life expectancy and literacy, alongside the more obvious, capturable results
such as spending, as well as participation indicators and those that indicate
other constraints,50 in order to draw better conclusions.
While Chilton and Versteeg acknowledge some of these questions—for
example, they note that their analysis leaves open the possibility that social
rights can vary the allocation of resources without changing overall spending,51
and that their measure does not detect slow-moving changes—the findings
are better summarized as answering a different, more measurable, and far less
consequential question than how constitutional rights matter. Rather, their
question is whether the constitutionalization of rights to education or health
care increases aggregate education or health care expenditure, controlling for
variables such as urbanization (by which they deliberately omit attention to
organized workers), percentage of elderly in the population, economic growth,
and inflation. To that question, it is not surprising that the answer would be no.
C. Disaggregating Organizations
This focus on individual and organizational rights provides an interesting
hypothesis of how constitutions matter. Organizations are central, by which
they mean formal organizations such as churches, trade unions, and political
parties. This is a very provocative triumvirate of organizations that matter
very distinctively (and sometimes in opposition to one another) with respect
to constitutional rights.Each organization operates under very different
mechanisms, for example, in seeking out constitutional representation, or
in support of other fundamental rights. This insight will no doubt lead to
further instructive findings on the balance struck by differently positioned
organizations, such as ideas about the separation of party and state, union and
state, and church and state.
This focus on organizations calls for further analysis of how constitutional
rights matter, in two important ways. The first, not canvassed by the study,
is how organizations work to obstruct rather than enforce constitutional
rights. While the study does note in passing that “powerful vested economic
interests” might oppose certain rights, particularly those concerned about
49

These measures find that social spending alone is likely insufficient. Cf. Chilton & Versteeg,
supra note 9, at 184 (citing Emanuele Baldacci et al., Social Spending, Human Capital, and Growth in
Development Countries, 36 World Dev. 1317 (2008)).
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access or the tax bill associated with spending on social rights,52 the authors
do not venture to examine this feature of constitutional politics in any detail,
or to factor it into their theory of rights effectiveness. This is an ironic omission
in a study so alert to the associational potentials of corporatized groups, when
private groups exercising significant political power— such as private military
contractors, pharmaceutical companies, financial and tech corporations, real
estate developers, private schools, doctors associations, natural resources
companies—have long operated to limit particular interpretations of
constitutional rights. The artificial boundaries of constitutional theory have
thus artificially influenced their empirical research design, and factual findings,
in significant ways.53
Second, Chilton and Versteeg are interested in separating organizational
rights from the general freedom of association enjoyed by both specific and more
general collectives. Indeed, the authors distinguish organizational rights with
the constitutional freedom of association enjoyed by other rights defenders,
such as human rights organizations or education interest groups. They also
note that these associational freedoms do not help secure rights in the same
degree, partly in light of observations about a “closing space” for contemporary
civil society,54 which they adopt. To be sure, Chilton and Versteeg’s study does
not delve very deeply into the makeup or transnational coordination of the
networks behind such rights (the literature on the changing membership
base of Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch is not assessed, for
example; nor is the vibrant advocacy basis (such as patients groups or parents
pro-education groups) identified beyond the organizations of hospitals
or schools).55
Similarly, the authors restrict themselves from exploring other “protective
constituencies” that may serve to protect distinctive interpretations of
individual rights. They do acknowledge the ready power gained, for example,
by the National Rifle Association’s protection of the right to bear arms in the
United States;56 but they do not in this current work explore similar dynamics
with respect to the rights under study. And they do not incorporate into their
model the contributions of more informal, dynamic collectives, such as Twitter
or Facebook groups or the other forms of spontaneous action or protest that
52
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have become key to moments of constitutional instability and change.57 We
might add other constituencies, such as the social movements (or the trade
unions) that have sought support for both health care and education alongside
each other.58 Instead, their focus is to survey formal organizations with a more
direct rights agenda, rather than these more dynamic, and perhaps harder-tomeasure, rights constituencies. The failure to address the role of these “looser”
organizations or more indirect constituencies might be considered a missed
opportunity in the book, or at least a subject for future research.
Conclusion
Chilton and Versteeg are ambitious practitioners of empirical—and
largely quantitative—analysis, and they apply it indefatigably to comparative
constitutional law. Their findings, particularly in relation to the rise of
organizational religious freedom rights, are worth testing further, particularly
with further qualitative study. In several passages in the book they acknowledge
the criticism that asserting causal answers by these sorts of empirical studies
can do more harm than good. Nonetheless, they are not content to merely air
plausible theories or flag the mechanisms or scope conditions of constitutional
success; they aim to provide causal explanation and are reluctant to “make
the perfect be the enemy of the good” for such a monumentally important
field of study.59 They therefore undertake to measure cause and effect in
comparative constitutional law through controlling for an expansive number
of variables, such as the wealth of a country, its population size, its democratic
status, whether it is engaged in war, its judicial independence, and its regime
durability (for civil and political rights); and its economic growth, inflation,
population age, and urban population (for economic and social rights).60 It
is worth noting that very convincing arguments have been made against these
types of claims, including from the perspective of “decolonizing” the field of
comparative constitutional studies61—arguments not ignored but perhaps not
fully addressed by the authors. Notwithstanding these criticisms, this book
provides an expansive overview of the global reach of constitutional rights, and
some notable findings about the uneven supply of the formal organizations
that are motivated to defend them.
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